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ABSTRACT
This paper presents an empirical test of the proposition that
control of a monetary aggregate will generate a rise in its velocity.
The test is carried out utilizing the Canadian experience of controlling
Ml growth from 1975:3 to 1982:3. Section One of the paper presents
evidence of the instability of the Canadian demand from Ml money since
1975:3. Section Two develops a specific form of the proposition which
emphasizes the role of asset substitution between classes of chartered
bank deposits. A relative asset demand equation is derived from a
wealthmaximization model subject to a technological transactions
constraint and this equation isestimated from 1961 through 1982.
The results lend support to the proposition that central bank control
of Ml generated a rise in Ml velocity.
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Over the past nine years there has been extensive documentation of instabil—
ity in the U.S. Ml demand for money function. Since this instability implies
less predictability between money and nominal flCoflE, it raises serious doubts
about the ability of the monetary authorities to control nominal income through
a policy of targeting the growth rates of monetary aggregates.
The evidence on the instability of the money demand function has been re-
viewed recently by Judd and Scadding [1982] and they note that it has spawned
two distinct research agendas. First, it is argued that financial innovation
has changed the meaning of the monetary aggregates which the authorities are
attempting to control. The solutions implied by this argument are either
to redefine the aggregates to include the new instruments which are substituting
for Ml money in the payments mechanism, as the Federal Reserve has done re-
cently, or to attempt to model the process of innovation thereby restoring pre-
dictability to the relationship between money and nominal income.
The second line of research has followed the suggestion that the perceived
stability of the demand for money prior to 1973 was in fact a misconception.
The reality, it is maintained, was that a number of issues regarding the appro-
priate specification of money demand were swept under the rug because the data
could not generate a resolution of them.' Consequently the pre—1973 debate has
been reopened in the hope of generating a more robust specification of the
demand for money.
In this paper I focus on the first approach and attempt to shed some light
on the process of innovation utilizing Canadian data. The basic framework is
that of Silber [1975, 1982] who suggests that innovation results from the at——2—
tempt of banks to circumvent constraints imposed upon the banking industryor
its customers. These constraints can arise either through centralizedpolicy of
the government or through the normal functioning of markets. Regardless ofthe
source, however, this framework suggests that if changing conditions increase
the shadow price of adhering to a constraint firms will have an incentiveto
undertake or intensify the search for new financial instruments.
One application of this constraint—induced innovation hypothesis has been
carried out by Simpson and Porter [1980] who concentrate on the effects ofhigh
interest rates on the interest elasticity of Ml demand. Given higheroppor-
tunitycosts of holding money, individuals will impute a higher rate of return
toinvestment in new techniques of money management. In addition, the restric-
tion on the payment of interest on demand deposits will induce banks toinnovate
in this area. This twofold effect, it is alleged, results in new instruments
such as lock boxes or ATS accounts which lower the demand for Ml.Furthermore,
should interest rates subsequently decline the process will notreverse itself
because the resource costs of the new techniques and instruments have been in-
curred. Simpson and Porter attempt to capture this effect through an interest
rate ratchet variable which allows for a lag between peaks in interest rates and
subsequent innovations. Their results, however, do not suggest that this tech-
nique is sufficient to restore confidence in the Ml function.
A more fundamental interpretation of circumventive innovation issuggested
by the Kaldor hypothesis [1970] that an attempt by the authorities to control
thegrowth rate of a monetary aggregate will result in a rise in the velocity of
that moneyas private agents substitute to another payments mechanism.2 -—3—
Thechoice of interpretation is of more than passing interest because of the
profoundly different policy implications. The former suggests either a respeci—
fication of Ml demand or the choice of a broader aggregate to internalizeany
substitution which might occur. While it is recognized that during a period of
rapid innovation it may be difficult to achieve desired stability and predict-
abilityin the money demand function, the basic thrust of this interpretation
does not appear to undermine the case for control of a particular monetary
aggregate. The latter interpretation, in contrast, does appear to question
the basic policy. Bluntly put, any single—minded pursuit of a particular mone-
tary target is destined to fail because private agents will innovate to escape
the cutting edge ofthe control.
An attempt to provide empirical evidence for or against the latter hypothe-
sis is hampered by the fact that the experience of the Federal Reserve with
targeting on monetary growth rates has coincided with an environment of high
market rates of interest and restrictions on the payment of interest on depo-
sits. As argued above, this combination could be the trigger for innovation.
In addition, the move to deregulation has spawned new instruments such as the
NOW account and the new money market account; innovations which a priori should
lead to a reduction in Ml demand. As a result, it does not appear possible to
separate the effect, if any, of the Kaldor hypothesis from the forces mentioned
above.
The Canadian experience with controlling monetary aggregates appears to be
appropriate for an empirical test of the Kaldor hypothesis for the following
reasons. First, the stated policy of the Bank of Canada from the fourth quarter—4—
of1975 until the fourth quarter of 1982 was a gradual reduction in the rate of
growthofMl and, of equal importance, this policy was effected to a consider-
able degree.3 Second, during this period there was no restriction on thepay-
ment of interest on deposits nor was there anysubstantialchange in the
regulatory environment facing the banking industry. Third, over the period in
question there has been substantial financial innovation and, unlike the U.S.
experience, this has occurred within the chartered banking system. Finally,
during this same period there has been a significant rise in Ml velocity after
accounting for both trend and the rapid rise in interest rates.
Indeed, for the above reasons one could argue that the Canadian environment
ofl97'5 through 1982 will closely resemble that of the United States in the
decade aheadand should therefore be able to provide clues as to what difficul-
ties await the Federal Reserve.5
In what follows, Section I discusses the nature of financial innovation in
Canada and presents some evidence relating to the instability of themoney demand
function. Section II models the Kaldor hypothesis in the context of circumven—
tive innovation and presents a test of the hypothesis. Section III summarizes
the main conclusions of the paper.
Section I
A. Financial Innovation in Canada6
The financial innovations of the past eight years which have influenced the
demand for Ml have occurred both in the corporate and household sectors. In
the former category, the first major innovations occurred in the mid—seventies—5—
and they took the form of new cash management techniques which allowed corpora-
tions to minimize daily working balances. Oneofthe more important of these
is the centralized concentration account which allows for consolidation of
several, perhaps geographically dispersed, accounts. A report is issued to the
corporate treasurer the morning following deposits and he may allocate these
funds as he seesfit.In addition, this period witnessed the introduction of
regional lock boxes and preauthorized account withdrawals which reinforced the
tendencyto minimize working balances.
Inthe past tio years, banks beganto accept standing orderson how to
employ surplus funds overnight. Twoofthe options offered are interest—bearing
notice deposits (which are not included in the definition of Ml) or the auto-
matic paydown of outstanding demand loans. Either of these options would tend
to reduce the demand for Ml balances.
On the household side, the major innovations have been the introduction of
daily interest savings accounts and daily interest chequable savings accounts.
Prior to the third quarter of 1979, chartered banks calculated interest on
savings accounts based on the minimum monthly balance. Consequently, funds
received during the month such as salary payments were deposited typically in
personal chequing accounts. With the advent of daily interest accounts in
August and September, 1979, individuals would have a much greater incentive to
economize on demand deposits within the month.
The second innovation occurred in the latter half of 1981 with the introduc-
tion of daily interest chequable savings accounts. Prior to this change savings
accounts could not as a rule be used for transactions purposes. The new—6—
accounts are actually hybrids of saving and demand in that interest is paid
above a minimum balance and withdrawals, while subject to a fee, are not
restricted. Since this is technically a notice deposit, it is not included in
the definition of Ml and the spread of this account would tend to reduce Ml
balances.7
The combined effect of these innovations has had a significant effect on
the Ml demand function and the next section presents some evidence of this
effect.
B. Stability of the Demand for Money
Landy [1980] presents some evidence on the stability of the Canadian Ml
demand function since 1915. Utilizing the technique of out—of—sample dynamic
forecasting, she identifies a break (downshift) about the second quarter of
1976. Hem [19801 has noted that dynamic forecasting tends to exaggerate the
duration of any shift since it captures the lags in adjustment of money to the
newlevel of demand. He argues that static forecasts will present a more ac-
curate picture of any shift in thedemandfunction. Consequently, it seems
appropriate to reconsider the evidence.






where M currency plus chartered bank demand deposits (Ml);
Pimplicit GNP deflator (1971 =100);—7—
RP90 day prime corporate paper rate;
yreal GNP;
and
DUMI, i =1,2 ;dummy variables to control for the effect of the
interruption of the payments mechanism due to postal
strikes.
The addition of dumnr variables is necessitated by the apparent
willingness of the Bank of Canada to accommodate the teorary increase in
demand for liquidity which occurs during a postal strike. A strike tends to
delay households' payments to firms but it does not interrupt some of
firms' financial obligations such as payrolls. Consequently, an uncorrected
money demand function will tend to underestimate money at the time of a
strike.
Gregory and MacKinnon [19801 argue that the partial adjustment model
which underlies equation (1) requires the addition of a lagged dunury whenever
a dummy is included. The coefficient of the lagged dummy mist be constrained
to equal the negative of the product of the coefficient of the lagged depen-
dent variable and the contemporaneous duinny. This procedure was followed in
the estimation of equation Ci).
Since the nature and duration of postal strikes has differed signifi—
cant],y, separate dummies were added for each strike. The coefficients for
the strikes of 1965:3, 1968:3, 1970:2, 1915:1, 1980:3 and 1981:3 are insigni-
ficant are the ten percent level and are not included in the final
regression. The coefficients for the strikes of 19714:2 and 1975:4 are signi——8—
ficant at the five percent level and are essentially identical. In the final
regression they are constrained to be equal. The coefficient for the strike
ofl978:4is significant at the ten percent level.9
Table 1 presents estimates of equation Ci)forthe 1956:1 —1976:1and the
1956:1 —1982:3saiile periods. The choice of sample period follows that of
Landy. While the differences between the samples are not as pronounced as that
for the U.S. equation, the general pattern is maintained. The coefficient on
the lagged dependent variable rises from 0.736 to 0.900. This implies that the
mean adjustment lag increases from 3.8 to 10 quarters which suggests an
implausible lag. The impact elasticity for real income is halved and the long—
run interest elasticity rises from 0.20 to 0.55. The standard error of the
equation also increases by 25 percent.
A standard F test for structural stability allows one to reject the hypothe-
sis of stable coefficients across the hypothesized break point of 1976:1. The
calculated F statistic of 5.09 exceeds the one percent critical value of 3.51.
Further evidence of the instability of the function is demonstrated by an
analysis of the equation's forecasting ability. Post—sample static forecasts of
equation (i), based on the coefficient estimates from the 1956:1 —1976:1
regression, are presented in Table 2. In every quarter the equation over—
predicts Ml demand. The root mean square error is more than three times the
standard error of the in—sample equation andthefraction of error attributed to
bias (one—sided prediction) is 58%.—9.—
Table 1




Period Constant ln(M/P)—1 ln(RP) ln(y)DUM1 DUM2 S.E.E. D.W.
1956:1 —1976:1—0.293 0.736 —0.053 0.2010.030 0.0114 1.64
(4.99)(i6.4o)(9.22) (7.28)(4.61)
1956:1—1982:3—0.378 0.900 —0.0550.1020.029 0.020 0.01431.76
(6.12)(26.52)(8.49)(4.63) (3.84)(1.91)
1.The numbers in parentheses are absolute values of t—statistics. DUM1 set equal
to 1 for 1974:2 and 1975:4, zero otherwise; DUM2 set equal to 1 for 1978:4,
zero otherwise.—10—
Table 2
Post—sample Static Forecast Errors 1976:2 -1982:31
Forecast Forecast
SummaryStatistics
Year/Quarter Error(%) Year/Quarter Error(%) RMSE BIAS
76:2 0.60 79:3 0.36 0.340 0.58
:3 0.21 79:4 0.69
:4 0.61 80:1 0.25
77:1 0.22 80:2 0.96
:2 0.36 80:3 0.53
:3 0.46 80:4 0.49
:4 0.33 81:1 0.72
78:1 0.31 81:2 0.36
:2 0.24 81:3 1.00
:3 0.13 81:4 1.90
:4 0.34 82:1 0.69
79:1 0.34 82:2 0.64
:2 0.24 82:3 2.04
1
One—periodahead forecasts are based on the coefficient estimates from the
1956:1 —1976:1period. The forecast errors are the predicted less actual logs
of real money balances.—11--
Whiletheabove evidence would tend to support a claim that the demand for
moneyhas altered over the past seven years, it does not provide any clues
as to the nature ofthe breakdown. If the function simply experienceda one-
timechange in intercept without a change in slope coefficients, then one could
still retain confidence in the underlying economic relationships. However, if
the instability were due to the omission of variables or to fundamental changes
in relationships, then the implications for control of monetary aggregates are
much more serious.
In order to gain a better understanding of the nature of the instability one
can utilize the Breusch and Pa,n [1979] test for random coefficient variation.
The test statistic is one half the R2 times the sample size of a regression
of the squared residuals from equation (1) on the squared values of the
10 2
explanatory variables. This statistic is x with degrees of freedom equal
to the number of explanatory variables. The calculated statistic of 13.82
exceeds the one percent critical value of 1l.3L Therefore, we can reject
the null hypothesis of zero coefficient variation over this period.
Since the post 1976:1 sample has been characterized by substantially higher
interest rates on average, a log—linear form which constrains the interest elas-
ticity to be constant might be expected to perform more poorly than a semilog
form. Equation (i) was reestimated using the natural value rather than the log
of the interest rate and was subjected to the same tests as outlined above.
The F test statistic of 4.22 supports a rejection of the null hypothesis of
structuralstability at the one percent level. The out—of—sample predictions
showless bias than those of equation 1but there is a tendency to overpredict—12—
from 1976:2 to 1980:3 (sixteen out of eighteen quarters) and underpredict after
1980:3 (six out of eight quarters). In addition the Breusch and Pagan test
statistic of 14.42 supports a rejection of the hypothesis of zero coefficient
variation again at the one percent level. We conclude that the money demand
function cannot be rehabilitated simply by a change in functional form.
Since the hypothesis under investigation deals with the velocity of Ml, we
have investigated this variable directly. Table 3 presents the results of a
regression of the log of Ml velocity on a constant term, the log of the three—
month treasury bill rate, and time for four subperiods between 1954 and 1982.
The niest striking feature of the results is that the estimated quarterly growth
rate in Ml velocity averages 0.47 percent from 1954:4 to 1975:3 and 1.1 percent
since the advent of targeting of Ml in 1975:3. Also, the interest rate variable
for the last period is not significant. The F test statistic supports a rejec-
tion of the hypothesis of structural stability about 1975:3 at the one percent
level of significance.
In anticipation of the discussion of Section II, Table 4presentsthe re—
suits of an analysis of the velocities of currency, demand deposits and time
deposits. This data demonstrates that the rapid acceleration in Ml velocity
over the past seven years can be attributed primarily to the increase in demand
deposit velocity. This result together with the fact that the time deposit velo-
city growth rate increases in absolute value by 150 percent over this same period
indicates that significant deposit substitution has occurred since the targeting of
Ml began.—13—
Table3
Estimated Rate of Growth in Ml Velocity
Coefficients1 SummaryStatistics2
Period Constant Ln(RT) Time DUM1 DUM2
54:4 — 61:3 1.96 0.030 0.005 0.97 0.97
(24.60) (1.65) (2.77) (7.14)
61:4 —68:3 2.23 0.068 0.005 0.99 0.67
(27.8) (3.02) (5.87) (4.77)
68:14 —T5:3 2.33 0.049 0.004—0.034 0.99 0.80
(31.9) (2.12) (2.93) (2.51) (7.30)
75:14 —82:3 2.33 0.011 0.010 —0.039 —0.025 0.99 0.72
(23.90) (0.29) (6.18) (1.82) (1.50) (5.30)
1. RT is the 3 month treasury bill yield. DUM1 is set equal to 1 for 1974:2
1975:4, zero elsewhere. DUM2 is set equal to 1 for 1978:4, zero elsewhere.
numbers in parentheses are absolute values of t—statistics.
and
The
2. p represents the value for the Beach and McKinnon [1978] adjustment for
serialcorrelation.
Table 14
Estiniated Rates of Growth of Currency, Demand and
Time Deposit Velocities
Velocity Growth Rates (%perquarter)
Period CurrencyDemand DepositsTimeDeposits1
61:4 —68:3 0.62 0.49 —0.42
68:4 —75:3 0.19 0.54 —0.66
75:4 —82:3 0.65 1.14 —1.65
1. Time deposits are defined as M3 —Ml.—14—
Section II
The maintained hypothesis under investigation is that the rise in Ml velo-
city above trend over the past eight years is a result of the attempt by private
agents to circumvent Bank of Canada policy of a gradual reduction in Ml growth.
The rationalization for this attempt at circumvention is straightforward. An
announced policy of a reduction in the growth rate of a particular monetary
aggregate should generate a reduction in expectations of future inflation,
assuming that these expectations are formed in a rational manner, and sub-
sequently, to a decline in nominal interest rates. If, however, the stance of
fiscal policy in inconsistent with this announced policy (as it was in Canada
over the period in question) then rational individuals may find the monetary
policy lacking in credibility and they may not revise their expectations of
inflation.11 As a. result, the ensuing reduction in liquidity will raise
interest rates.
As individuals perceive higher opportunity costs of holding money balan-
ces they may attempt to substitute towards interest—bearing deposits.
Substitution will be constrained by the fact that interest—bearing deposits
are a less efficient payments mechanism than Ml money and individuals may
look outside the banking system for alternatives.
Chartered banks have two options open to them to prevent competitors
from attracting their deposits. They can pay interest on checking accounts
or they can enhance the efficiency of other types of deposits as mediums of
exchange through innovation. The tradeoff banks face in choosing between
these alternatives is the eight percent differential in reserve requirements—15-.
betweendemand and time deposits and the cost of innovation. Presumablysome
combinationof the two options will be optimal which suggests that innova-
tions 'will generate greater substitution from Ml to time deposits than in
previous periods.
The above argwnent suggests that the rise in Ml velocity is linked
directly to deposit substitution. It follows, therefore, that to test the
proposition that Ml velocity is a function of the degree of control of Ml one
requires a model of the decision process by which private agents determine
the relative holdings of various monies.
Following Chetty [1969] and Moroney and Wilbratte [1976],weassume that
households maximize financial wealth subject to a monetary transaction
constraint.-2 Formally, define financial 'wealth inperiod t as
w(t)M(t)+X1(t)[l+r.(t)], (2)
where M(t) nominal Ml money balances;
x.(t)nominal holdings of the 1th class of interest—bearing assets;
andr.(t)nominal interest rate of the iasset.
We assume the technolor by which households combinemoney and interest—
bearing financial assets is given by equation (3).
T3(t)=I8(t)M(t)+1(t)x1(t)], (3)
where TS(t) volume of transactions services undertaken in period t;
technical coefficients on money and interest—bearing assetsrespectively;
and p, p. substitution parameters of money and interest—bearing assets
respectively.
As Moroney and Wilbratte note, the above formulation assumes that the deci-
sions affecting the relative portfolio holdings of money and assets X1 are inde—
pendent of the yields on physical and human capital; an assumption which
Bisignani [19151 tests and accepts using U.S. data. If, in addition, we assume
that p =p
=p
for all i and j (an assumption which Moroney and Wilbratte
could not reject) then we can approximate equation (3) by its CES form.




where m(t) the optimal ratio of Ml to X;
the relative technolor coefficient of theth asset;
Ei/(1±),the elasticity of substitution between Ml and
and g(t)1/(1+r1(t)).
Finally, we note that there is no reason to assume that remains constant
over time especially given our knowledge of the trend rateof increase in Ml
velocity. As a working hypothesis we assume that is a function of per-




and the difference between the coefficients on andrespectively.
The justification for equation (5) is twofold. First, the inventory approach
to modelling money demand suggests that there are economies of scale asso-
ciated with the level of income. We assume that these scale economies may be
approximated by a rise in which is the relative technolor coefficient of
the th asset. Second, permanent income is a trend—demoninated variable and
as such it may be expected to capture the effects over time of changes in the
transactions demand for Ml money which are unrelated to the control of Ml.
Substituting equation (5)intoequation (n),takinglogs and adding a
duruiiyvariableand an error term yields the equation to be estimated.
in m.(t) =a+bln(t) +clng(t) +6DIJM1+c,
(6)
where a —1n iO
b
c a, the elasticityof substitution between Ml and X.;
and DUM1 1 for 19714:2 and 1975:14, zero otherwise.
We can utilize equation (6) to test directly whether banks pursued a policy
of deposit substitution as a result of central bank control of Ml. If the
hypothesis is correct, some form of structural instability of equation(6)
should appear about the breakpoint of 1975:14 and with the addition of a suitable
proxy variable we should be able to model this instability.
Defining M3—Ml as the interest—bearing asset and the chartered bank
three—month deposit rate as the relevant interest rate, we estimated equation—18—
(6) using quarterly data from 1961:1 to 1982:3. Y(t) and g(t) were estimated
in distributed lag form since the estimation results of equation (i) suggests
a mean lag in adjustment of actual to desired money balances of close to four
quarters prior to 1915:3. The lags were estimated with a second degree poly—
nomial. We imposed an endpoint restriction of zero for the seventh and
fourth lags for Y(t) and g(t) respectively.
The initial estimate by ordinary least squares yielded a D.W. statistic
which indicated positive autocorrelated disturbances and hence a specification
error. Two possible sources of error are the assumption that the transactions
technolor is of a CES type and that the portfolio relationship between Ml money
and time deposits of chartered banks is independent of the yield on physical or
human capital.
Utilizing equation (3) which implies a more general techno1or, we derived
an equation corresponding to equation (6) and estimated it over the same sample
period with M2—M1 and M3-Ml as the relevant alternative assets. Again, the D.W.
statistic indicated positive autocorrelation and the correlation correction
yielded estimates of rho which were not significantly different from that of
equation (6). Therefore we conclude that the assumption of a CES technolor is
not a source of error in equation (6).
If the assets in the transactions constraint are not separable from physical
or human capital, then the m.(t) which we estimated would not be invariant to
changes in theyieldson these assets. In order to test for this type of rela—
tionship, we included an inflationary expectations proxy in equation (6). The
proxy variable is that of Riddell and Smith [19821 who generate forecasts from—19—
an ARIMA model estimated from a moving sample of 38)4monthlyobservations
beginning in 1921. The method of moving sample insures that agents formexpec-
tations on previous experience only rather than on the basis ofexperience
over the entire sanle.13 Again the estimation yielded an estimate of rhonot
significantly different from that of equation (6). We conclude that, to the
extent that our proxy accurately measures inflationary expectations, the
assumption of separability of physical capital from financial assets in the
transactions technolor is not the cause of the specification error.
Accordingly, equation (6) was reestimated using the Cochrane—Orcutt
method of correction for autocorrelation. Prior to the presentation of the
regression results let us review the a priori restrictions on the coef-
ficients. First, since the sum of the c coefficients is the elasticity of
substitution between Ml and time deposits, it should be positive. Second,
given our knowledge of the trend rates of growth of Ml and time deposit
velocities, the sum of the b coefficients is expected to be negative
Third, is the initial estimate of the technical coefficient of time
deposits relative to Ml money in the transactions technolor and as such we
expect it to lie in the unit interval. Since the elasticity of substitution
is positive, the restriction on can be restated as a restriction that the
constant is nonnegative.
Considerthe first row of Table 5 which presents the results of the
regression of equation (6)overthe sample period 1962:14—1975:)4. The
constant is positive and highly significant. The coefficients on current and
lagged permanent income are significant and their sum is negative as expected

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































the view that individuals view Mlmoney, amongotherthings, as a temporary
abode of purchasing power until it can be allocatedin an optimal fashion
among all assets.
The coefficents on current and lagged interestrates are significant and
possess the correct sign. The sum of these coefficients whichrepresents the
elasticity of substitution between Ml and tine deposits is2.91. This com-
pares to an elasticity of 6.09 between Ml and chartered bankpersonal savings
deposits obtained by Short and Villanueva 119771using annual Canadian data
over the period 1951—1973. The calculated initial valueofis 0.26 which
satisfies the a priori restiction.
Since rho is insignificant from one at the 5percent level, the equation was
reestjmated in first difference form. The individuallag coefficients and the
mean lags are statistically identical as is theelasticity of substitution. We
conclude that equation (6) is a robust specification ofthe relative asset
demand of Ml and M3—M1 over the sample period inspite of the restrictive assump-
tions used in its derivation.
Row two of Table 5 presents the results of theregression over the post—
policy—change sample.Theresults indicate significant structural instability.
The constant is of the wrong sign and together withthe elasticity of substitu-
tion of impliesan initial value of 8 of 1.67. Also, the sumofthe b
coefficients is positive counter to a prior expectations. Thecalculated F sta-
tistic of 11.01 exceeds the one percent critical valueof 4.ii, a result which
supports a rejection of the null hypothesis of structuralstability.
Perhaps the most striking result of this regression is the fact thatthe
coefficient of serial correlation turns negative and isinsignificant for the—22—
post—T5:14 sample. Given the difficulty in eliminating autocorrelation in the
sample 1962:14 —19T5:,this is indeed surprising. Since the total sample still
exhibits autocorrelation, one might be tempted to explain the disappearance
ofautocorrelation with technical arguments such as problems with the number of
degrees of freedom. However we are unable to find any other twenty quarter
sample which does not possess autocorrelation. Consequentlywe interpret the
disappearanceof autocorrelation as evidence of a fundamental change in the
actionsof private agents resulting from the policy change of the Bank of
Canada which occurred in 1975.
If the hypothesized relationship between control of the money supply and
innovations in the underlying transactions technolor is valid, then it
should be possible to model these innovations with an additional variable
which reflects the degree of control. In other words, equation (6) is
incompletely specified for the post—control sample and we require another
variablewhichmeasures the degree of central bank control of Ml.
Thehypothesissuggests that chartered banks will have an incentive to
utilize costly resources to effect deposit substitution when they perceive a
reduction in the rate of growth of money relative to some average of past
rates. There are marrj reasons for believing that this relationship maybe
subject to significant lags. Banks will wish to insure that current down-
turns reflect a permanent reduction in the rate of growth of money before
undertaking expenditures for innovations. There may be delays before
research and development efforts culminate in innovations. Also, bringing
the new technolor on line may involve significant lags. Consequently it—23—
seems appropriate to model these effects with a variable which provides
flexibility in the relationship between the rate of growth ofmoney and inno-
vations.
With the above in mind, we propose a variable defined as the difference
between two moving averages of the rate of growth of Mi.15Formally, let jj
denotethe quarterly growth rate of Ml. We define S(t) by16
i=t
1 S(t) =— 1. — — m>n. (1)
i=t—m+l jt—n+l
Since m exceeds n, a positive S reflects a sustained reduction in therate of
growth of Ml which, by hypothesis, should result in deposit substitution from
Ml to time deposits.
The evidence in Table 5indicatesthat the structural change in the relative
assetdemand equation is centered primarily about the constant term andby
implication Accordingly, we propose as a working hypothesis thatis a





That is, a rise in S will generate innovations which, byassumption, impact
on the relative technolor coefficient of time deposits. Substituting
equation (8) into equation (4),takinglogs, and adding a dumnr variable and




A priori, we expect d to be zero for the period 1962:4 —1975:4and nega-
tive for the period 1977:3 —1982:3.
Equation (9) was estimated for the periods in question and the results are
presented in Table 6. For the period 1962:1 —19T5:4,the coefficient on S is
insignificant as hypothesized. The constant term standard error declines but
there is no appreciable change in the lag structure or sum of lags on permanent
income. The last two lags on the interest rate turn insignificant. The stan-
dard error of the regression shows little change.
For the period 1977:3 —1982:3,the coefficient on S possess the correct
sign and is highly significant. The constant term turns positive and is highly
significant. The estimate of 80 accordingly declines to 0.31 from 1.67. The
standard errors of the b coefficients decline appreciably and the sum of these
coefficients is now negative. The standard error of the equation declines by 55
percent. The addition of S also induces negative serial correlation.
Since the results in Table 6 indicate that the innovation prow performs
as hypothesized, we reestimated equation (9) with the restriction that d =0
for the period 1962:1 through 1971:11-. The results of these regressions are pre.-
sented in Table 7.
A comparison of rows one and two reveals surprising similarity in the
underlying parameters of the transactions services technolor. The elasticity
of substitution is 2.91 in the first sample and 3.14 in the second sample. The





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































thecorrect magnitude and are very close. Thesumofthe b coefficients should
be considered identical.
Given the rather large differences intechnolor between the two samples
implied by Table 5,weconsider the conformity achieved by the additionof S to
be quite remarkable. Recall that weassumed innovations impact on the rela-
tive technolor coefficient rather thanon the elasticity of substitution.
Also, our proxy variable for innovations could beconsidered crude at best.
Yet, inspite of these restrictive assumptionswe are able to achieve a high
degree of conformity in parameters over the twosamples. We conclude that this
evidence supports the hypothesis that the risein the velocity of Ml above trend
over the past eight years can be linkedcausally to the decision of the Bank of
Canada to target on the growth rate of Ml.
III Conclusions
Theexperience of Canada with a central bank policy oftargeting Ml growth
suggests that there maybea fundamental difficulty in controlling the rate of
inflation through a policy of targeting on thisvariables. The evidence pre-
sented inthis paper indicates that the degree of controlof Ml growth does have
a significant role to play in explaining the rise in thevelocity of Ml and, as a
consequence, the inflation rate has taken much longer torespond to restrictive
monetary policy than nest observers would have predictedprior to the policy
inactnient.
It would appear that the noninterest—bearingcharacteristic of Ml plays an
important role in explaining this causal link since itmay, on occasion, provide—28.-
chartered banks with an incentive to increase the monetary effectiveness of
other classes of deposits. However, this interpretation is not necessarily
warranted. Recall that Canada is free from restrictions on the payment of
interest on any type of deposit. Accordingly, chartered banks could have ini-
tiated interest payments on demand deposits in the face of sharply higher market
rates of interest. We argued that the differential reserve requirerxnt probably
influenced the decision to innovate rather than pay interest. Yet, as long as
the option of innovation is open to the private sector, there will always be the
possibility of nonprice competition through the enhancement of the transactions
efficiency of deposits.
The characteristic which appears to be critical in explaining the rise in Ml
velocity is the scope of the targeted aggregate. A narrow definition insures a
wide selection for deposit substitution through innovation. Therefore, the
case for control of a narrow aggregate would appear to be weakened considerably
by the evidence presented in this paper.—29—
Footnotes
1.See Laidler 11980] for a discussion ofsome of these issues.
2. Kaldor appears to be the firstto present this view although it has
been proposed as well by Holland [1975]who coined the phrase circumventjve
regulation. Notes that this interpretation invertsthe adage that expansionary
monetarypolicy is akin to "pushing ona string."
3.The annual rate of growth of Ml from1975:3to1982:3 has been 7.3,
8.7, 10.2, 7.9, 4.6, 4.3, and0.1 percent respectively. Thiscompares to an
averageannual rate of 13.1 percent over theprevious five years.
4. SeeLancly [1980]and Silber [1982] for a discussion of theinnovations
in the U.S.
5. On this note, it should be pointedout that in November of 1982 the
Bank of Canada publicly abandoned itspolicy of targeting on Ml growth because
of the instabilityofthe demand function and attendant diffjcultjes.
6. ThIs section drawsheavily upon Freedman [19821 and Landy [1980].The
interested reader is referred to thesearticles for a more complete discussion.
7. The reluctance of banks to offerpure interest bearing checking
accounts is no doubt due to the differential of8%in the reserve requirement
on these and savingsaccounts.—30--
8. All variable definitions and data sources can be found in the appendix.
9.It is surprising that the strike of 1981:3 which lasted 143 days does
not generate the hypothesized underprediction of money. Could it be that the
general public is adapting to the frequent interruptions of postal service in
Canada?
10. The regression was run over the period 1972:14 to 1982:3. While the
sample contains observations prior to the hypothesized break about 1976:1, it
was necessitated by the minimum test requirement of forty observations.
11. For a formal derivation of this proposition the reader is referred to
Sargent and Wallace [1981].
12. This interpretation is due to Moroney and Wilbratte [1976]. In the
original article Chetty assumed a CES utility function and maximized utility
subject to a wealth constraint. The difficulty with this interpretation is that
it assumes the only motive for holding assets is to facilitate transactions ser-
vices.
13. See Friedman [1979] for the theoretical argument for this type of
approach.
114. Moroney and Wilbratte also report positive autocorrelation in their
estimates of equation (6) for the U.S. using governnnt debt and corporate debt
as well as time deposits of commercial banks. Nor are they able to explain the
cause of the specification error.—31—
15. In an earlier attempt weconstructed a ratchet variableutilizing rates
of growth of Ml of' a typeproposed by Simpson and Porter [19801. Theuse of a
ratchet variables seems warrantedbecause once the costs of aninnovation have
been incurred it will be maintainedeven if the forces leading to itsadoption
are mitigated. However we found thatthe use of this type of variableresults
in insignificant b coefficients.We interpret this result as evidenceof multi—
collinearity between permanent income and theratchet variable, as might be
expected, since both variables are dominatedby trend. Consequently, we
followed the approach described inthe text.
16. The values of m andn were determined by the data. The bestresults
were obtained with m equal to 20 andn equal to 5.—32-.
Appendix
Alldatain this study were supplied by CANSIM. Interest rate observations
and money holdings are quarterly averages of seasonably adjusted monthly data.
Ml: Currency and demand deposits —SeriesB1609.
M3: Currency and all checkable, notice, and personal term deposits plus
Canadian dollar non—personal fixed term deposits and bearer term
notes —SeriesB1603.
r: Chartered Bank 90 Day deposit rate —SeriesB1)-L018.
rp: Prime corporate 90 day paper rate —SeriesB11tO1T.
rt: 90 Day Treasury bill yield —SeriesBl400T.
Y: The permanent income series was constructed using de Leeuw's [1965]
formula:
Y(t) =0.1114(o.9)t(y)t,t=0...19,
where y is GNP deflated by the implicit price deflator.
GNP: Gross national product at market prices —SeriesD240252.
F: GNP Deflator —SeriesD140625.—33—
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